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ON AMERICAN DEMAGOGUERY TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Jennifer Brumfield

I. INTRODUCTION
Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing, once all
other possibilities are exhausted.1 The United States Intelligence
Community is one example of the truthfulness of this statement. From
their inception, intelligence agencies have conducted investigations in
ways that infringe on the rights of Americans.2 In 1976, Senator Frank
Church of Idaho established a select committee in the United States
Senate to investigate alleged improprieties in how the Intelligence
Community gathered its information.3 The final report, known as the
Church Committee report, consists of six books and seven volumes of
testimony detailing systemic disregard for the law and liberties of
American citizens.4 The Church Committee identified abuses committed
by various intelligence agencies, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”), and the National Security Agency (“NSA”).5
Lack of oversight and regulations in the Intelligence Community were
the primary factors contributing to these abuses of power. The Church
Committee report stated that “establishing a legal framework for agencies
engaged in domestic security investigation is the most fundamental
reform needed to end the long history of violating and ignoring the law.”6
The final report included legislative and regulatory recommendations
intended to provide greater checks and balances within the Intelligence
Community.7 The Church Committee established the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”) to provide “vigilant legislative

1. This quote is often attributed to Winston Churchill, though there are doubts as to its
authenticity. See The Churchill Project, Americans Will Always Do the Right Thing, HILLSDALE COLLEGE
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/americans-will-always-right-thing/ (confirming
that while Churchill may have expressed this sentiment, it has not been discovered in any transcript,
memoir, published or private writings, speech, or correspondence).
2. DAVID KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS, § 2.2 (3d ed. 2019).
3. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted, establishing the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities).
4. See id.
5. See
S.
REP.
No.
94-755,
bk.
1
(1976),
[hereinafter
Church
I],https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee/mode/2up.
6. See S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. 2, at 296 (1976) [hereinafter Church II],
https://archive.org/stream/ChurchCommittee/Church%20Committee%20Book%20II%20%20Intelligence%20Activities%20and%20the%20Rights%20of%20Americans#mode/2up.
7. Id. at 296-97.
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oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that
such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.”8 The Committee also recommended that the Attorney
General, as the Chief Legal Officer of the United States, be charged with
ensuring intelligence agencies follow the law when conducting
investigative activities.9
Imposing a legal and regulatory structure on the intelligence
community proved to have a substantial impact on the way secretive
national security investigations are performed in the United States.10 The
most prominent legislative example is the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”), signed into law by President Jimmy Carter in
1978.11 Congress envisioned FISA to remedy the misuse of electronic
surveillance detailed in the Church Committee report by requiring judicial
review of all foreign intelligence electronic surveillance conducted within
the United States.12 FISA has been amended numerous times since its
inception and the narrow criteria to obtain a FISA warrant under the
original law has expanded to allow FISA evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions.13
A recent decision from the Ninth Circuit highlights the danger of
allowing prosecutors to use FISA information during criminal trials. In
July 2014, Su Bin, a China-based businessman, was arrested in Canada
and charged with conspiring to steal secrets regarding the C-17 military
transport plane manufactured by Lockheed Martin.14 Previously, Wired
magazine reported that China may have acquired some of the C-17’s
blueprints from a spy who worked at Boeing.15 After reading the Wired

8. See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted). In addition to the SSCI, Congress established
the House Permanent Select Committee on Investigations in response to the Church Committee
recommendations.
9. Church II, supra note 6, at 332.
10. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 2.7.
11. See id.; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801-1855c, Title 50 U.S. Code, Chapter 36.
12. FISA Conference Report, see also Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf#page=1.
13. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3.9. Originally, a “wall” existed between foreign
intelligence and law enforcement agencies that prevented the use of evidence gathered during a FISA
warrant from being used in domestic criminal prosecutions. Later amendments to FISA have eliminated
the wall. See infra Section III(A).
14. See Matt Hamilton, Chinese Citizen is Sentenced to Prison in the U.S. for Plotting to Steal
Military Secrets, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-chineseboeing-hack-prison-sentencing-20160713-snap-story.html.
15. David Axe, China’s Giant Transport Plane Takes Flight, WIRED (June 28, 2013),
https://www.wired.com/2013/01/china-transport-first-flight. A previous version of this Wired article,
published in December 2012, identified the potential Boeing spy as Dongfan Chung. Chung was convicted
in 2011 of providing Boeing trade secrets to China. United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2011).
The updated version of the Wired.com article states only that “Beijing may have also acquired some of
the C-17’s blueprints from a spy working at Boeing.”
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article, an FBI agent began to look for Su's possible accomplices. 16
Eventually, the FBI arrested Keith Gartenlaub, a senior engineer at
Boeing.17 The impetus for focusing on Gartenlaub centered on the fact
that his wife was a naturalized Chinese-American citizen and his in-laws
lived in Shanghai.18
The FBI monitored Gartenlaub for over a year and obtained a warrant
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to monitor his home.19
Using this FISA warrant, the FBI tracked Gartenlaub’s phone calls,
emails, and bank records, in addition to breaking into his home and
copying computer hard drives.20 The FBI found no evidence of
espionage.21 However, the FBI claimed to have found child pornography
on one of Gartenlaub’s hard drives.22 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
Gartenlaub’s conviction for knowingly possessing child pornography, a
charge many degrees removed from espionage—the purpose for which
the FISA warrant was granted. The Supreme Court denied Gartenlaub’s
petition for writ of certiorari.23
This Article discusses the risks of using information gathered in the
pursuit of foreign intelligence, ostensibly for national security reasons, in
domestic criminal prosecutions. In these situations, defendants have no
ability to access the information underlying the FISA warrant, no ability
to challenge the evidence being used against them criminally, and thus no
realistic chance to defend themselves. This Article also explores whether
restricting the use of non-responsive FISA information is even possible
in light of the ever-expanding authority granted to the Intelligence
Community. First, this Note analyzes the history of the Intelligence
Community, the role of the FBI within that paradigm, and the persistent
violations of American liberties in the name of national security. Next,
this Note chronicles the Title III warrant requirements and the FISA

16. Brief for Appellant at 6, United States v. Gartenlaub, 751 F. App’x 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (No.
16-50339), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27920. Wesley Harris, an agent in the Los Angeles FBI office,
launched the investigation after reading the Wired.com articles.
17. United States v. Gartenlaub, No. SA CR 14-173-CAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192041, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015). Gartenlaub was arrested on August 27, 2014.
18. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7.
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gartenlaub v. United States, 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
1005, at *11-17 (Mar. 7, 2019). Agent Harris originally obtained a warrant pursuant to FRCP Rule 41.
Unable to find evidence of national security crimes, Harris then applied to the FISC for a secret warrant
under the FISA statute.
20. Id. at *16.
21. Id. at *10.
22. Id. at *19. The FBI was granted a second Rule 41 warrant to search Gartenlaub’s home, this
time for evidence of child pornography. Its probable cause affidavit in the warrant application stated
evidence was found “during a court-authorized search without notice.”
23. Gartenlaub v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1609 (Apr. 22, 2019) (certiorari denied by U.S.
Supreme Court).
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statute from their origin to the modern-day versions, and how the
September 11, 2001 attacks significantly impacted the use of FISA in
intelligence gathering. This Note will next argue for reform of the current
procedures around when information from FISA warrants is used in
criminal prosecutions, analyzing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Gartenlaub, which erroneously prevented the defendant from
viewing the underlying FISA warrant application. Finally, the Note
concludes by examining the risks of allowing intelligence gathered for
foreign investigations to be used domestically and offers suggestions for
mitigating the harm to criminal defendants.
II. BACKGROUND
The law governing National Security Investigations (“NSIs”) is a vast
and storied attempt to answer the question of “whether liberty and security
are locked in a zero-sum game.”24 Criticism of recent investigations
involving political actors, including the President of the United States,
provides a ripe opportunity to explore whether and to what extent
curtailed liberties are truly necessary under the cloak of national
security.25 Section II(A) discusses the structural hierarchy of the
Intelligence Community and the role the FBI plays in domestic
intelligence gathering. Section II(B) discusses systematic abuses in the
collection of intelligence against American citizens and the reform
measures taken by the legislative and judicial branches in response to
those improper procedures. Section II(C) provides background
information regarding the origin and current nature of Title III and the
FISA statutes, including the fall of the so-called “FISA wall” after 9/11.
Lastly, Section II(D) analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s United States v.
Gartenlaub decision.
A. The Intelligence Community and the FBI
The Intelligence Community as we know it today originated with the
National Security Act of 1947.26 The purpose of the 1947 Act was to

24. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 1.1.
25. On July 31, 2016, the FBI opened an investigation into whether the Trump campaign
coordinated with the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Inspector
General of the DOJ found serious and significant errors in the FISA applications on Carter Page, discussed
infra Section III(B). See generally, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of Four
FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation (Dec. 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
26. Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 2, 61 Stat. 496 (1947). Before the National Security Act of 1947,
intelligence activity conducted by the federal government mainly consisted of activities by military
branches, the State Department, or the Office of Strategic Services.
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“provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United
States, [and] to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and
procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the
Government relating to national security.”27 The drafters of the 1947 Act
faced the seemingly unworkable puzzle of how to create one collective
Intelligence Community out of related but separate departments of
government, while also balancing the national security powers granted to
the President in Article II of the Constitution. 28 The drafters’ solution was
to create the National Security Council, over which the President presides,
to organize the disparate entities, act as the arbiter of information, and
advise the President with respect to national security matters. 29 The 1947
Act also organized the Army, Navy, and Air Force under a single
Secretary of Defense and created the CIA.30 Today, the Intelligence
Community consists of seventeen separate organizations headed by a
Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”).31
Unlike the CIA, the FBI existed prior to the National Security Act of
1947.32 In 1908, the FBI was formed in order to have an agency capable
of enforcing federal criminal laws and handling national security issues.33
The jurisdiction, mission, and organizational structure of the FBI has been
in flux since its inception:
At first, agents investigated mostly white-collar and civil rights cases,
including antitrust, land fraud, banking fraud, naturalization and copyright
violations, and peonage (forced labor). It handled a few national security
issues as well, including treason and some anarchist activity. This list of
responsibilities continued to grow as Congress warmed to this new
investigative force as a way to advance its national agenda. In 1910, for
example, the Bureau took the investigative lead on the newly passed Mann
Act or “White Slave Traffic Act,” an early attempt to halt interstate
prostitution and human trafficking. By 1915, Congress had increased
27. 50 U.S.C. § 3002.
28. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, §§ 1.2-1.3.
29. See id. at § 1.3.
30. See id.
31. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Member Agencies, U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAREERS,
https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/icmembers.html (last viewed Feb. 2019). The member list as of
February 2019 includes: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Department of Energy, Department of
Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration,
U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corp., and U.S. Navy.
32. A Brief History: The Nation Calls, 1908-1932, FBI , https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history
(last viewed Feb. 9, 2019) (stating “It all started with a short memo, dated July 26, 1908, and signed by
Charles J. Bonaparte, Attorney General, describing a ‘regular force of special agents’ available to
investigate certain cases of the Department of Justice. This memo is celebrated as the official birth of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation—known throughout the world today as the FBI”).
33. See id.
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Bureau personnel more than tenfold, from its original 34 to about 360
special agents and support personnel.34

While not technically authorized to investigate subversive activities in
the United States, the FBI’s appropriations statute allowed it to
investigate any matter requested by the Executive Branch through the
State Department.35 This lack of legislative authority allowed President
Franklin Roosevelt to determine a basic domestic intelligence structure
and choose which government agency would carry out the general
objectives beyond criminal investigation. 36 In cooperation with Attorney
General Homer Cummings and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Roosevelt
approved a joint FBI-military plan for domestic intelligence in 1936.37
The jurisdiction granted for this FBI domestic intelligence included vague
and conflicting orders to investigate “subversion” and “potential crimes”
related to national security.38 It also included a mandate to investigate
foreign involvement in American affairs.39 The FBI remains the primary
civilian agency charged with domestic intelligence responsibilities in the
United States.
Roosevelt’s decision to place control over the FBI’s domestic
intelligence investigations solely at the direction of the executive branch,
with no congressional oversight, resulted in the FBI becoming
increasingly isolated from outside control. 40 By 1942, the FBI was
responsible for all investigations “coming under the categories of
espionage, subversion, and sabotage . . . involving civilians in the United
States.”41 The FBI began to resist supervision in the area of national
security by its parent agency, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the
Attorney General.42 When Congress did pass legislative statutes
establishing standards and procedures implicating FBI programs, FBI
officials chose to disregard Congress and proceed with the programs

34. Id.
35. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 1.7.
36. See Church II, supra note 6, at 392.
37. See id. Roosevelt, Hoover, and Cummings deliberately excluded Congress from this
policymaking process to keep the President’s orders secret. A memo prepared by Hoover stated: “In
considering the steps to be taken for the present structure of intelligence work . . . in order to avoid
criticism or objections . . . by either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior motive . . .
it would seem undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that is
was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any great magnitude.”
38. See Church II, supra note 6, at 24-27. It is unclear precisely what the President’s reference to
“subversion” or “potential crimes” was intended to cover for investigative purposes.
39. See id.
40. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 2.6.
41. Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division (Feb. 9, 1942).
42. See Church II, supra note 6, at 22.
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unchanged.43 Thus, by the time the National Security Act was passed in
1947, the culture at the FBI was already one of independence as far as
national security investigations were concerned. As such, being subjected
to a new reporting scheme under the National Security Council changed
virtually nothing about how the FBI proceeded. 44 Indeed, not until 2007
were DOJ attorneys “given comprehensive authority to examine the FBI’s
national security program for adherence to all applicable laws,
regulations, and guidelines.”45
B. Improper and Illegal Techniques
The Church Committee report documented stunning details about the
breadth and depth of improper investigative techniques being deployed
against American citizens by the FBI.46 While recognizing that
government actors often have legitimate purposes to covertly gather
information about American citizens, the report confirmed that actions
taken by the FBI “exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental
power which are imposed by our country’s Constitution, laws, and
traditions.”47 The report focused on three types of intelligence activities—
gathering of information, dissemination of that information, and covert
activity—and found widespread abuse in all three areas.48 The main
problems identified in the report were numerous: too many people spied
on, too much information collected, the use of intrusive and surreptitious
techniques, political groups and private citizens being surveilled based on
their lawful political lobbying, and blatant disregard for the law when

43. For one example, see Church II, supra note 6, at 54-57. Congress passed the Emergency
Detention Act of 1950 establishing standards and procedures for detained persons in the event of war. FBI
officials decided the statutory procedures, which included recourse to the courts instead of suspension of
habeus corpus, would destroy their secretive compiling of a security index of “potentially dangerous”
persons to be detained immediately in the event of war.
44. See Church I, supra note 5, at 45. In the years immediately following passage of the NSA of
1947, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower both declared the FBI was still authorized to broadly investigate
“subversive activity,” with no directive to limit the allowable procedures. Truman also approved the
creation of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to supervise coordination between the FBI and
the military of all intelligence matters affecting internal security.
45. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, National Security Division Launches New Office of
Intelligence (Apr. 30, 2008), available at https://fas.org/irp/news/2008/04/doj043008.html.
46. Abuses were not limited to the FBI. See, e.g., Church II, supra note 6, at 6 (detailing the CIA’s
opening and photographing of first-class letters, the NSA’s obtaining millions of private telegrams sent to
or from American citizens, and the IRS’s opening of tax investigations based on political rather than tax
criteria).
47. Church II, supra note 6, at 2.
48. See id. at 1. The committee defines intelligence gathering as activities such as “infiltrating
groups with informants, wiretapping, or opening letters,” and defines covert activity as “action designed
to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order.”
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conducting these activities.49
Historical lack of oversight allowed the FBI to order investigations into
any person or group it wished to investigate with minimal supervision.
Counterintelligence techniques previously deployed only against hostile
foreign actors were turned inward and used against “perceived domestic
threats to the established political and social order.”50 The FBI labeled
these domestic techniques as also being counterintelligence programs,
designating them with the acronym “COINTELPRO.”51 Between 1956
and 1971, the FBI approved over two thousand COINTELPRO actions.52
By 1975, the FBI possessed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files.53
Each file contained information on more than one individual or group,
meaning that the number of American citizens unknowingly under
surveillance was far higher than number of files.54 At one point, the FBI
even maintained a list of at least 26,000 people to be immediately
apprehended and detained in the event of a “national emergency.” 55
These programs’ widespread gathering of information targeted citizens
and domestic groups for reasons bearing no relation to national security.
Instead, the premise of the programs was to use the FBI as a law
enforcement agency to eliminate perceived threats to the current political
and social order of the country.56 According to the FBI, groups promoting
ideologies such as women’s liberation, civil rights, or opposing political
views threatened domestic tranquility.57 One of the first COINTELPRO
initiatives, conducted against the Communist Party, USA (“CPUSA”),58
did appear to have national security as its intended motivation: “We were
trying first to develop intelligence so we would know what they were
doing, and second, to contain the threat. . . . To stop the spread of
communism, to stop the effectiveness of the Communist Party as a vehicle
of Soviet intelligence, propaganda and agitation.”59 However, the FBI’s
CPUSA program quickly expanded to non-Communists and persons with
49. See id. at 5.
50. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. 3, at 4 (1976) [hereinafter Church III],
https://archive.org/stream/ChurchCommittee/Church%20Committee%20Book%20III%20%20Supplementary%20Detailed%20Staff%20Reports%20on%20Intelligence%20Activities%20and%2
0the%20Rights%20of%20Americans#page/n10/mode/2up.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Church II, supra note 6, at 6.
54. See id.
55. Memorandum from A.H. Belmont to L.V. Boardman (Dec. 8, 1954).
56. See Church III, supra note 50, at 3.
57. See id. at 4.
58. CPUSA still exists today and bills itself as “a political party of the working class, for the
working class, with no corporate sponsors or billionaire backers.” See COMMUNIST PARTY USA,
www.cpusa.org (last visited on March 26, 2020).
59. Church III, supra note 50, at 5.
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little to no affiliation with the group.60 Subsequent programs dropped the
pretense of being counterintelligence conducted for the sake of national
security purposes and became covert actions directed against American
citizens.61
Adapting programs from a playbook initially used by the FBI against
foreign agents resulted in the domestic use of wartime surveillance
gathering techniques. The use of “rough, tough, and dirty” tactics led to
American citizens under FBI surveillance being treated no differently
than enemy combatants.62 Many of the techniques internally approved by
the FBI for use were illegal and dangerous, carrying a real risk of causing
physical, emotional, or economic distress for the target. 63 The Church
Committee report provides many examples:
[The FBI] techniques ranged from anonymously mailing reprints of
newspaper and magazine articles to group members or supporters to
convince them of the error of their ways, to mailing anonymous letters to
a member’s spouse accusing the target of infidelity; from using informants
to raise controversial issues at meetings in order to cause dissent, to the
“snitch jacket” (falsely labeling a group member as an informant), and
encouraging street warfare between violent groups; from contacting
members of a legitimate group to expose the alleged subversive
background of a fellow member, to contacting an employer to get a target
fired; from attempting to arrange for reporters to interview targets with
planted questions, to trying to stop targets from speaking at all; from
notifying state and local authorities of a target’s criminal law violations, to
using the IRS to audit a professor, not just to collect any taxes owing, but
to distract him from his political activities.64

Over time, COINTELPRO’s covert action programs became aimed
primarily at five different groups posing a “threat” to national security. 65
In addition to the CPUSA, the FBI opened investigative programs into the
Socialist Worker’s Party, the White Hate Group, the Black NationalistHate Group, and the New Left.66 All of these labels were distinctions with
no clear definition and ultimately allowed the FBI to target persons it
deemed “rabble rousers,” “agitators,” “key activists,” or “key black

60. Church III, supra note 50, at 6.
61. See id.
62. See generally, Church II, supra note 6, at 11. In response to questioning about these tactics,
Sullivan testified that “This is a rough, tough, dirty business, and dangerous . . . No holds were barred . .
. We have used these techniques against Soviet agents. They have used them against us. The same methods
were brought home against any organization which we targeted. We did not differentiate.”
63. See Church III, supra note 50, at 8-9.
64. Id. at 8.
65. See id. at 4.
66. Id.
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extremists.”67
The FBI carried out these COINTELPRO programs knowing they
violated state and federal provisions against mail fraud, wire fraud,
incitement to violence, sending obscene material through the mail, and
extortion.68 The use of electronic surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.69
When told a program was illegal, the FBI justified its continued use on
the ground that “national security” permitted programs that would
otherwise be illegal.70 Supervisors abdicated responsibility by not asking
for details of particular programs that were known to use legally
questionable techniques.71 The overriding theme amongst the FBI was not
to ask whether the program was legal, but whether it would work.72
In terms of improper electronic surveillance tactics, the most infamous
example is the FBI’s wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Four
months after Dr. King led the March on Washington, FBI leaders
convened to discuss “avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as
an effective Negro leader.”73 Agents were ordered to gather information
to be used against King in an effort to discredit him.74 Over the next two
years, FBI agents placed at least fourteen microphones in Dr. King’s hotel
rooms across the country.75 Photographic surveillance accompanied some
of the microphone coverage. 76 The FBI monitored King’s tax returns,
created and mailed threatening tapes to his home, and attempted to
undermine King’s relationships with other leaders and institutions around
the world.77 After Dr. King’s death in 1968, agents proposed continuing
these illegal tactics in order to harass his widow and prevent his birthday
from becoming a national holiday.78 This historical background of abuse
played a large part in congressional effort to reform intelligence gathering
activity.

67. Church II, supra note 6, at 88.
68. Id. at 139.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 138.
71. See id.
72. Church II, supra note 6, at 141 (Sullivan testimony stating “The one thing we were concerned
about was this: Will this course of action work, will it get us what we want, will we reach the objective
that we desire to reach? As far as legality is concerned, it was never raised by myself or anybody else.”)
73. Church II, supra note 6, at 220.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 223.
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C. Reform Attempts and the Warrant Application Process
1. Title III Warrants
Prior to the enactment of FISA, electronic surveillance undertaken for
national security or foreign intelligence purposes was subject to little or
no judicial or legislative oversight. 79 In the lead up to World War II,
President Franklin Roosevelt approved warrantless wiretapping “to
secure information by listening devices directed to the conversation or
other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities
against the [g]overnment of the United States, including suspected
spies.”80 President Roosevelt accepted the Supreme Court’s previous
rulings which barred the use of evidence obtained from wiretaps in
criminal prosecutions,81 but concluded that the Supreme Court never
intended that dicta to apply “to grave matters involving the defense of the
nation.”82 Roosevelt’s claim represented the first time the Executive
Branch asserted the right to conduct electronic surveillance for national
security purposes.83 His memorandum authorizing warrantless electronic
surveillance was not questioned until 1965. During that time span, the
government conducted nearly 7,000 wiretaps and 2,200 microphone
surveillances.84 In addition to the wiretapping discussed above against
King and other political leaders, the government placed taps on the phone
lines of reporters and journalists to investigate leaks of government
information.85
Revelation of the many abuses within the Intelligence Community
motivated Congress to regulate wiretaps in Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”). 86 Title III set forth
circumstances and procedures to be followed in the use of electronic
surveillance.87 Chief among them was statute’s requirement that
79. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:1.
80. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 616 (D.C. Cir.1975).
81. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that warrantless electronic
surveillance conducted through non-trespassory methods is an unreasonable search and seizure that
violates the Fourth Amendment). However, the Court cautioned in a footnote that a Fourth Amendment
question involving the national security was not presented in this case. This footnote is the first indication
the Court may indeed believe there is a national security exception to the Fourth Amendment.
82. Zweibon 516 F.2d at 617.
83. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:1.
84. FISA House Intelligence Report at 16.
85. See Church II, supra note 6, at 63-65. A small sampling of the people Attorney General Robert
Kennedy approved wiretaps for includes: Nation of Islam officials, leaders of the Ku Klux Klan, Malcom
X, Newsweek reporter Lloyd Norman, and New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin.
86. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 – 56 (detailing
reasons for enacting Title III).
87. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802 (enacted June 19, 1968).
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government agencies obtain judicial authorization before conducting any
form of electronic surveillance.88 However, Congress implicitly assumed
the President had inherent authority to conduct electronic surveillance for
national security or foreign intelligence purposes and made clear that Title
III did not “disturb” the President’s powers in that arena. 89 The DOJ
concluded that warrantless electronic surveillance was acceptable within
the parameters of national security and foreign intelligence
investigations.90 This left the President with tremendous discretion to
target domestic citizens and groups without supervision or oversight from
the other branches of government.91
Four years later, the Supreme Court began attempting to limit
Presidential authority when conducting warrantless electronic
surveillance for national security purposes.92 The Court stated that
Section 2511(3) of Title III was merely a recognition of certain rights
granted to the Executive Branch constitutionally, not a conferral of power
for the President to conduct electronic surveillance “solely within the
discretion of the Executive Branch.”93 The Court held that in domestic
security cases, the Fourth Amendment required judicial approval before
the government conducted electronic surveillance.94 That being said, the
Court acquiesced that because “domestic security surveillance may
involve different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance
of ‘ordinary crime,’” the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard
differed from the Title III probable cause showing required to obtain a
criminal warrant.95 For practical purposes, the Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement applied to the domestic aspects of
electronic surveillance and any authority the President had to conduct
warrantless surveillance could only be used to protect against foreign
threats or for foreign intelligence purposes.96 Congress used this holding

88. 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3); See also, Legislative History, S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156 – 57.
90. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, §3:5. Title III identified five categories of presidential
action that fell outside its regulation: (1) protection of the United States against actual or potential attack
or other hostile acts of a foreign power, (2) obtaining foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States, (3) protecting national security information against foreign intelligence
activities, (4) protecting the Unite4d States against the overthrow of the government by force or other
unlawful means; and (5) protecting the United States against any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the government.
91. See id.
92. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (popularly called
the “Keith” case after the district judge who was the respondent).
93. See id. at 316-17.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 323.
96. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:6.
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as the backdrop against which it began drafting FISA in the late 1970’s.97
2. FISA Warrants
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) of 1978 regulated
national security investigations conducted by electronic surveillance, and
later by physical searches, for the first time. The misuse of electronic
surveillance by the FBI revealed in the Church Committee report guided
legislators in drafting FISA.98 Recommendation fifty-two by the
committee was that “all non-consensual electronic surveillance should be
conducted pursuant to judicial warrants issued under authority of Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.”99 The same
committee recommendation urged Congress to amend the Act to allow
surveillance of foreigners in the United States when there is probable
cause that “the target is an officer, employee, or conscious agent of a
foreign power” and the Attorney General has certified that the
surveillance is likely to reveal information necessary for national
security.100 After years of debate, Congress enacted FISA to authorize and
regulate certain governmental electronic surveillance of communications
for foreign intelligence purposes.
Originally, FISA regulated only electronic surveillance and not
physical searches. Congress felt that while it may be necessary to develop
legislative controls in this area, physical searches were sufficiently
different from electronic surveillance to require separate consideration by
Congress.101 Over the next fifteen years, warrantless physical searches for
the purposes of foreign intelligence required only that the Attorney
General determine the target was likely an agent of a foreign power and
approve of the type of activity involved. 102 In this same time period, the
judicial branch struggled to determine whether there was a foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause.103
Most courts agreed that “the Executive Branch need not always obtain a
warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance,” but that the “executive
should be excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is
conducted ‘primarily’ for foreign intelligence purposes.”104 This
97. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (recognizing that “when enacting FISA,
Congress legislated against the backdrop of our decision in” the Keith case).
98. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:7.
99. Church II, supra note 6, at 327.
100. See id.
101. FISA House Intelligence Report at 53.
102. Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978). This order reflects the requirements that
Congress would soon place on electronic surveillance in FISA.
103. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3.7.
104. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913-15 (4th Cir. 1980).
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“primary purpose” test concluded that a FISA warrant would violate the
Fourth Amendment if the information being gathered was used primarily
for a criminal investigation.105 This interpretation, distinguishing foreign
intelligence gathering for the purpose of national security from gathering
evidence for criminal prosecution, became known as the “FISA wall.”106
Congressional amendments to FISA after the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the United States eliminated the primary purpose test and the FISA
wall.107
The issue of warrantless physical searches came to the forefront in
1993 when the DOJ charged CIA employee Aldrich Ames with
espionage. The counterintelligence investigation conducted by the FBI
and CIA included a warrantless search of Ames’ home.108 There was
doubt within the DOJ about whether a court would find that the primary
purpose of the search was to further a criminal prosecution.109 This would
violate the FISA wall and result in the evidence gathered being
suppressed, despite then Attorney General Janet Reno’s approval of the
warrantless search. Ames pled guilty before the government was put in
the awkward position of having Reno testify as to her reasons for granting
the search.110 Shortly thereafter, in 1994, Congress amended FISA to
regulate foreign intelligence physical searches on the same terms
applicable to electronic surveillance searches. 111
D. United States v. Gartenlaub
On October 23, 2014, a grand jury in the Central District of California
indicted Keith Gartenlaub, an employee of Boeing, for receipt and
possession of child pornography.112 The investigation began in 2012
when Wesley Harris, an FBI agent in Los Angeles, read an article in
Wired magazine asserting that China may have acquired the blueprints for
certain Boeing aircraft military transport planes.113 No evidence pointed
to Gartenlaub; rather, Agent Harris focused on Gartenlaub because his
position at Boeing gave him access to the supposedly stolen data and his
wife was born in China.114 Harris obtained a standard judicial warrant
under Title III for electronic surveillance and obtained Gartenlaub’s and
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:7.
Id.
See infra Part III(A).
KRIS & WILSON, supra note 2, § 3:7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 16.
See id. at 5.
Id.
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his wife’s personal email accounts. 115 Not finding information to
corroborate his theory, Agent Harris then turned to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) and received a FISA warrant to
search Gartenlaub’s home and computers.116 Agents conducted the secret
search on January 29 and 30, 2014, and imaged three hard drives found
in the house.117 Again, the FBI found no evidence that Gartenlaub acted
as a spy for China. 118 The agents did find a handful of files containing
child pornography.119
Relying on the child pornography found during the FISA warrant
search—and describing the search in the probable cause affidavit only as
“a court-authorized search without notice”—FBI agents went back to the
magistrate judge for a Title III warrant to search Gartenlaub’s premises.120
At trial, Gartenlaub challenged the FISA search of his home and requested
disclosure of the underlying FISA application and order.121 He also
requested a Franks hearing to establish that the underlying FISA warrant,
and therefore the later Title III warrant obtained using information found
during the FISA search, contained “intentional or reckless material
falsehoods or omissions.”122 In response, the FBI submitted a classified
motion in opposition which the district court reviewed in camera and ex
parte.123 The court denied Gartenlaub’s motion to suppress the evidence
from either warrant, though it later expressed misgivings regarding the
propriety of the FISA court proceedings.124 The government provided the
defense team with a heavily redacted version of their motion in
opposition, effectively leaving Gartenlaub to mount a defense against
unknown and secret information.
No evidence emerged at trial showing that Gartenlaub was aware of the
files containing child pornography. The images had been copied onto his
hard drive as part of a mass migration of files, not downloaded in a cache
file or unallocated space.125 Nine years passed between the copying of the
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 3-4.
122. Id. at 4. Defendants generally cannot challenge the accuracy of information contained in a
search warrant. However, a defendant may request a Franks hearing in order to prove the probable cause
affidavit underlying the warrant deliberately provided false evidence or there was reckless disregard for
whether the information in the affidavit was truthful. If the defendant proves the affidavit’s content was
insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 4.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 15.
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files containing child pornography and the FBI seizing the hard drives.
During that time, the files were not opened or viewed.126 Multiple other
people had access to Gartenlaub’s computer during the relevant time
period.127 Lack of evidence notwithstanding, the jury convicted
Gartenlaub on both counts of receiving and possessing child
pornography.128 The district court dismissed the receipt count as
multiplicitous and sentenced Gartenlaub to forty-one months
imprisonment.129
III. DISCUSSION
The Gartenlaub decision, while problematic, followed the historical
tradition of courts denying defendants the opportunity to view FISA
information being used against them during prosecution.130 In fact, until
February of 2018, no defendant had ever been able to view a FISA
warrant application used against them. The reason always given was that
it would compromise the national security of the United States. In
Gartenlaub for example, then Attorney General Eric Holder declared that:
[T]he unauthorized disclosure of the FISA Materials that are classified at
the “TOP SECRET” level could reasonably be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States. I
further certify that the unauthorized disclosure of the FISA materials that
are classified at the “SECRET” level could be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security of the United States. The FISA Materials
contain sensitive and classified information concerning United States
intelligence sources and methods and other information related to efforts
of the United States to conduct national security investigations, including
the manner and means by which those investigations are conducted. As a
result, the unauthorized disclosure of the information could harm the
national security interests of the United States.131

It is hard to fathom how the detailing of an investigation into child
pornography would reveal state secrets critical to maintaining national
security. But the government knows this catch-all reasoning will face little
scrutiny. The mere invocation of “national security” is enough to ensure
intrusion into civil liberties with no oversight. American citizens,
especially in the wake of the September 11th attacks and the subsequent

126. Id.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See infra Section III(B) for discussion of the Carter Page FISA applications.
131. Government’s Notice of Filing Attorney General’s Declaration and Claim of Privilege at ¶ 5,
United States v. Gartenlaub, No. SA CR 14-173-CAS (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2015).
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demise of the FISA wall, have freely given up any pretense of demanding
privacy rights whenever the government demands those rights yield to
national security. Unfortunately, the judiciary has followed suit. Using
FISA in this manner contradicts the original congressional intent behind
the legislation. Further, the recent public disclosure of the Carter Page
application proves that underlying information contained in FISA
applications can, and should, be disclosed to defendants in criminal
prosecutions.
A. The Demise of the FISA Wall
As originally enacted, FISA created a wall between intelligence
agencies and law enforcement agencies. Maintaining this wall meant that
use of a FISA warrant for the primary purpose of collecting information
for criminal prosecution constituted a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.132 When applying for a FISA warrant, agents must first
identify the target and establish that the target is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.133 Next, a high-ranking executive is required to
certify that the purpose of the warrant was to obtain foreign intelligence
information. Only then could a judge of the FISC decide if there was
probable cause to allow surveillance of the target.
This process changed in response to the September 11th attacks. Shortly
thereafter, the DOJ asked Congress for an amendment to FISA to allow
greater coordination between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.
This amendment, Section 504 of the Patriot Act, allows federal officers
to “consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts”
when acquiring foreign intelligence information during national security
investigations.134 The Patriot Act also reduced the “primary purpose” test
to a “significant purpose” test. 135 Thus, the Patriot Act allowed FISA to
be used primarily to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, but only
if the prosecution concerns an offense related to a foreign intelligence
threat. The FISC divided crime into two categories— foreign intelligence
crimes and ordinary crimes—and held that FISA could be used to
primarily to obtain evidence of a foreign intelligence crime, but not of an
ordinary crime. In other words, the FISA wall between intelligence and
law enforcement no longer exists, contrary to the original intent of
Congress.
Even without the FISA wall, the FBI should not have been allowed to
target Gartenlaub using a FISA warrant. The FBI first obtained a criminal
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
50 U.S.C. § 1806(k) and 1825(k).
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
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search warrant for access to Gartenlaub and his wife’s email accounts in
its search for a supposed Chinese spy at Boeing. Failing to find such
evidence, the government then executed a physical FISA search warrant
to search Gartenlaub’s house and image his computers. The FBI had
permission to search for physical evidence relating to the specific
investigation of whether Gartenlaub was giving information from
Boeing’s computer network to China, not to electronically surveil and
copy every file on every hard drive owned by Gartenlaub to see what they
could come up with. The government is only supposed to target foreign
actors like Gartenlaub’s “well connected” Chinese parents-in-law, not
Gartenlaub himself. Yet by all appearances, the investigation started and
ended with Gartenlaub himself.
Additionally, child pornography is not a foreign intelligence crime.
Foreign intelligence crimes are defined by statute as attacks or potential
attacks against the United States, sabotage, international terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and clandestine activities
by an agent of a foreign power. 136 As applied to Gartenlaub, the statute
requires the FBI to search for information relating to the protection of the
United States against Chinese spying. Even the most generous reading of
the statute cannot plausibly be said to include child pornography.
Christopher Wray, current Director of the FBI, confirmed in a 2017
speech that child pornography is not foreign intelligence information.137
Authorization of the FISA warrant against Gartenlaub to primarily gain
evidence of an ordinary domestic crime violated congressional intent, the
FISC’s judicial interpretation of FISA, and the FBI Director’s public
assurances that child pornography could not be investigated as foreign
intelligence information.
B. The Carter Page Application
The decades old tradition of denying defendants access to their
underlying FISA warrant applications was finally broken in 2018 by an
unlikely hero: Devin Nunes, U.S. House Representative for California’s
22nd congressional district.138 In 2018, Nunes was also the chairman of
136. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c).
137. FBI Director Christopher Wray on FISA Section 702 Renewal, (CSPAN television broadcast
Oct. 13, 2017), at 31:09, https://www.c-span.org/video/?435695-2/fbi-director-christopher-wray-fisasection-702-renewal.
“The only stuff that’s in [the FISA application] is information about foreigners reasonably believed to be
overseas for foreign intelligence purposes. So that’s foreign intelligence information that’s in there. It’s
not evidence of, I don’t know, take an example, you know, child porn or, you know, something else. Could
be very serious, but that’s not what’s in there.”
138. Nunes’ memo represented a stark retreat from his usual strong support for FISA. Ironically,
Nunes sponsored and voted in favor of a bill reauthorizing FISA during the exact time period the Nunes
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the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) and
produced a memorandum suggesting the FBI improperly acquired a
wiretap on Carter Page.139 Nunes claimed that the FBI misled the FISA
court by failing to disclose its reliance on research conducted by an
opposing political party in the FISA application. The memo “raise[d]
concerns as to the legitimacy and legality” of Page’s FISA application,
alleged that the FISA warrant “may have relied on politically motivated
or questionable sources,” and stated the warrant failed to establish
probable cause.140 Conservative members of Congress argued that Nunes’
memo showed evidence of political bias in the FISA warrant process.
Not surprisingly, the DOJ opposed public release of the Nunes memo
because it contained information from the Page FISA application. The
FBI warned the memo was inaccurate and fell back on its usual defense
that release of the information would jeopardize classified information
vital to national security, in addition to setting a dangerous precedent.141
President Trump disagreed and declassified the memo for public release,
stating that “the public interest in disclosure outweighs any need to protect
the information.”142 Then Speaker of the House Paul Ryan agreed that
release of the HPSCI memo “provide[d] greater transparency” about the
FISA process and “ensure[d] the FISA system works as intended and
Americans’ rights are properly safeguarded.”143 Despite its opposition,
the DOJ eventually also released redacted versions of the four FISA
warrant applications for Carter Page on July 21, 2018.144
The release of the Carter Page FISA application for politically
motivated purposes should end any judicial deference given to DOJ
claims that releasing these warrants to criminal defendants somehow

memo circulated claiming abuse in the FISA process. E.g., FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of
2017, H.R. 4478, 115th Cong. (2018) (sponsored by Devin Nunes); See also Erin Kelly, House votes to
renew surveillance law that may collect Americans’ emails without warrant, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2018,
11:57 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/11/house-vote-privacy-advocatesoffer-changes-controversial-surveillance/1020930001/.
139. Carter Page is the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital, a fund investing in
the Russian energy sector. Page also served in some capacity for the Donald Trump campaign. See
Management, GLOBAL ENERGY CAPITAL, LLC, http://globalenergycap.com/management/ (last visited
Apr. 27, 2020).
140. See Lena Felton, The Full Text of the Nunes Memo, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/read-the-full-text-of-the-nunes-memo/552191/.
141. Reuters, Justice Department warned White House about releasing memo (Jan. 30, 2018, 10:06
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-memo/justice-department-warned-whitehouse-about-releasing-memo-washington-post-idUSKBN1FK0AJ.
142. Letter from John D. Cline to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Rule 28(j) Letter Concerning HPSCI Memoranda, United States v. Keith Gartenlaub, No.
16-50339 (Feb. 24, 2018).
143. Id.
144. See
Carter
Page
FISA
application,
available
at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4614708/Carter-Page-FISA-Application.pdf.
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presents a grave danger to national security. Gartenlaub, unlike Page,
presented real evidence of reason to suspect improprieties in the warrant
process. The original Title III warrant failed to establish any link between
Gartenlaub and Chinese spies. 145 Undeterred, Agent Harris turned to the
FISC with nothing more than his theory that a Boeing engineer with
Chinese in-laws must be a spy.146 When the FISA warrant also failed to
produce the corroborating evidence that Harris was sure existed, he
claimed Gartenlaub was in possession of child pornography. The FBI
based this accusation on files that were copied along with tens of
thousands of other files, not downloaded, onto Gartenlaub’s hard drive.147
Multiple other people had access to the computers and there was no
evidence the files were ever opened or viewed. 148 Gartenlaub proved the
investigative process was suspect in his case, but was still denied the
opportunity to view the FISA application and challenge the seemingly
non-existent probable cause leading to his conviction.
At the time of the Nunes memo’s release, Gartenlaub was awaiting a
decision from the Ninth Circuit challenging his own ability to access the
FISA warrant application obtained against him. Gartenlaub’s attorney
sent a letter to the Court pointing out the logical conclusion for his client
based on the DOJ’s handling of the Carter Page situation:
The declassification of the HPSCI memoranda demonstrates that it is
possible to discuss publicly the merits of a FISA application without
damaging national security. In addition, the declassification of the
memoranda highlights the absurdity of the government's assertion, in this
and other cases involving motions to suppress FISA surveillance, that any
disclosure of a FISA application, even to cleared defense counsel under the
protections of CIPA, would harm national security. If the HPSCI
memoranda can be disclosed without harming national security, as the
Executive Branch has determined, at least comparable disclosure of the
Gartenlaub FISA application can be made to cleared defense counsel under
CIPA without causing such harm.149

Surely, if all four Carter Page FISA applications can be released for
public consumption, then defense counsel across the country can be
trusted to view similar information without compromising national
security. The Ninth Circuit erred when deciding otherwise. Both the
executive and legislative branches decided that the public interest in

145. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7.
146. See id. at 9.
147. See id. at 10.
148. See id.
149. Letter from John D. Cline to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Rule 28(j) Letter Concerning HPSCI Memoranda, United States v. Keith Gartenlaub, No.
16-50339 (Feb. 24, 2018).
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Carter Page outweighed any need to protect the underlying FISA
information. It is past time for the “public interest” to include a criminal
defendant’s absolute right to the best possible defense. Zealous advocacy
is not possible in our adversarial system unless both sides have all the
facts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit squandered the best opportunity yet to push back
against the intrusive use of FISA-gathered intelligence in domestic
criminal prosecutions. The demise of the FISA wall in the Patriot Act
allows law enforcement to obtain evidence of ordinary crimes through the
use of FISA warrants, which were never intended to be used against
American citizens in this manner. Additionally, the release of the Carter
Page FISA application negates any good-faith argument by the
government that protecting the underlying information is critical to
national security. Carter Page should not be provided a level of due
process denied to other criminal defendants simply for being on the right
side of the current political administration. Congress should reinstate the
FISA wall during the next FISA reauthorization. At the same time, the
judiciary must stop giving the Intelligence Community the benefit of the
doubt. The line between foreign intelligence information and ordinary
crimes evaporated with Gartenlaub’s conviction. There is no mechanism
left to stop the FBI from switching back and forth between Title III
warrants and FISA warrants to prosecute American citizens domestically.
Unless the judicial branch steps up in its capacity as the stalwart of justice,
the erosion of American civil liberties will only continue.
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